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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of mind by either party. The second is that persons at interest
will be able to acquire knowledge of the existence vel non of an
act of adoption by or of a person. The first purpose, if to be
considered important at all between the persons involved, is
satisfied by registry, even if in a parish other than that speci-
fied by law. As to the second purpose, notice, it may be observed
that the failure of registry should hardly be opposable by one
who is not prejudiced by the lack of registry itself, and under
the facts of the case it could not be said that any prejudice had
resulted to the party opposing by reason of the lack of registry.
What may be said about the decision, however, is that the legis-
lation did not clearly require the result reached and, there being
no prejudice to anyone by the failure of registry, the refusal
to recognize the efficacy of the act needlessly destroyed the just
expectations of those involved. Of the legislation itself it may
be observed that, so far as notice is concerned, it would be much
more sensible to require an act of adoption to be recorded in the
parishes in which the adopter and adoptee live, rather than in
the parish of accidental place of execution.
PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
SERVITUDES
Among the servitudes imposed by law, Civil Code article 667
places a limitation upon a person's use of his property in that
"he cannot make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor
of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause
of any damage to him." Sometimes the remedy is an injunction,'
or if the harm is already completed the claim is for damages.2
Pile-driving operations can cause serious damage to nearby
properties, and article 667 has been applied in such situations.
*Professor fo Law, Louisiana State University.
1. City of New Orleans v. Degelos Bros. Grain Corp., 175 So. 2d 351 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1965) (emission of obnoxious and nauseous odors by a dehydrating
plant). Injunction denied for failure to discharge burden of proof, in Woods v.
Turbeville, 168 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
2. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 170 So. 2d 125 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1965).
3. Hauck v. Brunet, 50 So. 2d 495 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951) ; Bruno v. Em-
ployers Liab. Assur. Corp., 67 So. 2d 920 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953).
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However, when a house collapsed as a result of such operations
conducted by the State Department of Highways, the court held
that article 667 did not apply to this agency.4 It appears that
the Department is liable for breach of contract but is not liable
for torts under R.S. 48:22,, and the court considered "that the
action under Civil Code article 667 for the purposes of R.S.
48:22, is more analogous to an action ex delicto."6 The logic is
not compelling, and the policy reasons are not convincing since
there was liability insurance.
DEDICATION OF STREETS
When a new subdivision is opened, the developer makes a
plan showing the lots and the streets; this is used for advertis-
ing to sell the lots; and when duly recorded, this constitutes a
statutory dedication to the public of the streets and other areas
indicated for public use.7 In Parish of Jefferson v. Doody,8 it
was held that failure to comply with all the formal requirements
of the statute did not invalidate the dedication, but merely sub-
jected the developer to a penalty.9 In this case, the plan was not
signed, and it did not give the technical (section, township, and
range) location of the property; it was not certified by the par-
ish surveyor, and there was no statement of dedication. How-
ever, the plan was recorded, and it was evidently correct. It
would place an undue burden on prospective purchasers to have
to verify and bear the responsibility for these statutory com-
pliances by the developer.
In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeal,10 which ruled that there had not been sufficiently
substantial compliance with the statutory requirements. This
reversal should also be treated as denouncing the ingenious but
potentially dangerous reasoning of the court of appeal that "it
4. Klein v. State Department of Highways, 175 So. 2d 454 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1965).
5. Id. at 456.
6. Id. at 458 (emphasis by court). A more accurate statement by the court
elsewhere in the opinion is "A cause of action under C.C. 667 is neither ex delicto
nor ex contractu, but is a form of strict liability placed in the Civil Code under
the chapter on servitudes imposed by law." Id. at 457.
7. LA. R.S. 33:5051 (1950).
8. 247 La. 839, 174 So. 2d 798 (1965).
9. See also the later case, Deville v. Oity of Oakdale, 180 So. 2d 556 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1965), which reached the same conclusion but without reference
to the earlier decision.
10. 167 So. 2d 489 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
1966]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
is quite clear that when the owner sold lots in Canal Street
Subdivision fronting on Martin Behrman Walk, designated as
such on the recorded plan of subdivision, said owner thereby
created by title a servitude of passage over Martin Behrman
Walk in favor of those lots."11 A public street constitutes a right
of passage in favor of the public, but the sale of a lot according
to a plan cannot be considered as a title which creates a private
servitude in favor of certain individuals as distinguished from
a public street established by statutory dedication.
SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS
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VALIDITY OF TESTAMENTS
Certainty of Date
"If any principle in this most vexatious field of law is settled
by the jurisprudence, it is the rule that if any part of the date
appearing on an instrument purporting to be an olographic
testament is doubtful or uncertain, whether as to the day, month
or year, the effect of the incertitude or doubt about the date is
the same as if the instrument bore no date at all."' So speaks
the First Circuit Court of Appeal in Succession of Koerkel,2
wherein specimens of the testator's handwriting offered to
establish the year in which the testament had evidently been
written were held inadmissible.3 So holding, the First Circuit
chose to resurrect the Beird case 4 which, in this writer's opinion,
11. id. at 493. (Emphasis added.)
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Succession of Koerkel, 174 So. 2d 213, 216 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965). It
should -be noted that apparently no rehearing was applied for.
2. 174 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
3. The testament was dated "August 17" followed by the figures "19" and
two additional ciphers not readily decipherable but which the proponents of the
will, by the introduction of certain slips of paper containing figures purportedly
made by the testator, successfully established as being the numeral "51" so that
the year in which the will was made was proved to have been "1951" to the
satisfaction of the trial judge. The decision of the court is summed up in the
following language: "The date of decedentfs purported olographic will being
obscure, vague and uncertain and extrinsic evidence being inadmissible to resolve
its dubiety, it follows that the judgment of the trial court admitting such evidence
and declaring said will valid is erroneous and must be reversed." Id. at 221.
4. Succesison of Beird, 145 La. 755, 82 So. 881, 6 A.L.R. 1452 (1919).
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